One day short of a full chain: Part 3 – Chrome renderer RCE
In this last post of the series, I’ll exploit a use-after-free in the Chrome renderer (CVE-2020-15972), a bug that I reported in September 2020 but turned out to be a duplicate, to gain remote code execution in the sandboxed renderer process in Chrome.
This is the last post of a series in which I exploit three bugs that can be used to form an exploit chain from visiting a malicious website in the beta version of Chrome 86 to gain arbitrary code execution in the Android kernel. The first part of the series about the kernel exploit can be found here and the second part about Chrome sandbox escape here.
In this post I’ll go through the exploitation of CVE-2020-15972, a use-after-free in the WebAudio component of Chrome. This is a bug collision that I reported in September 2020 as 1125635. I was told that it was a duplicate of 1115901, although no fix was in place when I reported the bug. The bug was fixed in release 86.0.4240.75 of Chrome in October. More details about the bug can be found in GHSL-2020-167. This vulnerability affected much of the stable version 85 of Chrome, but for the purpose of this exploit, I’ll use the beta version 86.0.4240.30 of Chrome because the sandbox escape bug only affected version 86 of Chrome in beta. The exploit in this bug will allow me to gain remote code execution in the renderer process of Chrome, which is implemented as an isolated-process
in Android and has significantly less privilege than Chrome itself, which has the full privilege of an Android App. In order to escalate privilege to those of an Android App and to be able to launch the kernel exploit, this vulnerability needs to be used in tandem with the sandbox escape vulnerability 1125614 (GHSL-2020-165), which is detailed in another post. As explained in that post, our exploit targets the 64 bit Chrome binary, but the same primitives are also available to 32 bit binaries, so it should be adaptable to the 32 bit binary with changes in object layout and heap spraying.
As with my previous post on WebAudio exploitation, I’ll assume the readers to be familiar with some of the basics covered in my other post on Chrome UAF exploitation. Some of the basic concepts behind the WebAudio API can also be found here.
The vulnerability
Let’s first review a few concepts that are crucial to the understanding of the vulnerability and the exploit. I’ll start with audio graph. This is basically a graph that joins an audio source with a destination. Each node in the graph represents some processing that will be done to the result of the previous node. For example, the following javascript
let soundSource1 = audioContext.createConstantSource();
let convolver = audioContext.createConvolver();
soundSource1.connect(convolver).connect(audioContext.destination);
creates a simple audio graph that applies a convolution to the input to obtain the output. This is just a simple linear graph:
An audio graph can be somewhat more complicated with different branches, such as when the ChannelMergerNode
is used:
let soundSource1 = audioContext.createConstantSource();
let merger = audioContext.createChannelMerger(2);
let soundSource2 = audioContext.createConstantSource();
let convolver = audioContext.createConvolver();
soundSource1.connect(convolver).connect(merger, 0, 0);
soundSource2.connect(merger, 0, 1);
merger.connect(audioContext.destination);
Here the audio graph consists of two branches as follows:
As audio processing is a computationally intensive task, it will be done on a separate audio thread so that the browser remains responsive. Audio inputs in WebAudio are processed in units of 128 frames, called “quantums.” Once a quantum has started processing, the whole quantum will have to be completed, which means that all nodes will have to process those 128 frames, even if some nodes got deleted and garbage collected by the main thread.
let soundSource1 = audioContext.createConstantSource();
let convolver = audioContext.createConvolver();
soundSource1.connect(convolver).connect(audioContext.destination);
audioContext.startRendering(); //<-------- start processing the audio graph
convolver = null;
gc();
In the above case, convolver
will actually not be deleted, because every node is holding a reference to the output node that it connects to. However, if we disconnect the node
let soundSource1 = audioContext.createConstantSource();
let convolver = audioContext.createConvolver();
soundSource1.connect(convolver).connect(audioContext.destination);
audioContext.startRendering(); //<-------- start processing the audio graph
soundSource1.disconnect();
convolver = null;
gc();
then convolver may be deleted while the audio graph is still being processed. So how does a dead node carry on processing audio data? In WebAudio, an AudioNode
is actually only an interface to javascript, the actual processing is handled by the AudioHandler
that it owns. When an AudioNode
is destroyed, it will check if a quantum is being processed at the moment, using the IsPullingAudioGraph
function:
void AudioNode::Dispose() {
...
if (context()->IsPullingAudioGraph()) {
context()->GetDeferredTaskHandler().AddRenderingOrphanHandler(
std::move(handler_));
}
...
}
If a quantum is being processed, it’ll transfer ownership of the AudioHandler
(handler_
) to deferred_task_handler_
that is owned by the AudioContext
itself. The DeferredTaskHandler
will then ensure that the AudioHandler
stays alive until the processing of the quantum finished, and then clean up the “orhpaned” AudioHandler
.
There is, however, an exception. If the javascript frame containing the audio graph got destroyed, for example, when the iframe
containing the graph is destroyed, then DeferredTaskHandler
will perform the clean up immediately while a quantum is still being processed by calling the ClearHandlersToBeDeleted
function, which will remove the orphaned AudioHandler
. This was not a problem because a mutex was used to stop ClearHandlersToBeDeleted
from being called while a quantum is processing. The mutex, however, was removed in this commit, making it possible to delete the orphaned AudioHandler
while they are still in use for audio processing, causing use-after-free.
Before the mutex is removed, the AudioHandler
is protected:
After the mutex is removed, the AudioHandler
can be removed while it is still processing:
Of course, in an actual situation, the processing of a single quantum by a ConvolverHandler
would have finished too quickly, making it impossible to delete in time. While this can be solved by creating a large audio graph to increase the processing time (as the quantum then needs to be processed by many nodes), it would still be very hard to practically exploit this, as there would be very little control of when the AudioHandler
is deleted and I could end up anywhere in the processing code while this happens.
Controlling the race
To actually exploit the bug, I need to be able to control the race so that when the AudioHandler
is deleted,
1. I have control of what code the audio thread will be running with a free’d AudioHandler
.
To actually exploit the bug, I need to be able to control the race so that when the AudioHandler
is deleted,
1. I have control of what code the audio thread will be running with a free’d AudioHandler
.
2. I have a chance of replacing the free’d AudioHandler
before that code is run.
To do this, I’ll use the AudioWorkletNode
. The AudioWorkletNode
is a special node that uses a user defined javascript for processing:
await audioContext.audioWorklet.addModule('tear-down.js');
let worklet;
worklet = new AudioWorkletNode(audioContext, 'tear-down');
let convolver = audioContext.createConvolver();
soundSource.connect(worklet).connect(convolver).connect(audioContext.destination);
The above script will register an AudioWorkletNode
that uses the tear-down.js
script to process the audio input. I can simply make the script wait for an arbitrary amount of time to delay the processing:
class AutoProcessor extends AudioWorkletProcessor {
process (inputs, outputs, parameters) {
sleep(5000);
return true
}
}
As the processing of convolver
runs after worklet
, this gives me plenty of time to delete and replace the ConvolverNode
. For example, if I do something like this in an iframe
await audioContext.audioWorklet.addModule('tear-down.js');
let worklet = new AudioWorkletNode(audioContext, 'tear-down');
let convolver = audioContext.createConvolver();
soundSource.connect(worklet).connect(convolver).connect(audioContext.destination);
audioContext.startRendering();
sleep(200);
worklet.disconnect();
convolver = null;
gc();
parent.removeFrame(); //<-------- Get parent frame to delete outselves;
then convolver
will be deleted while worklet
is still running. (This is just an over-simplified version and would not reliably remove convolver
, as convolver
first needs to be deleted and then garbage collected before the iframe
gets deleted, which usually means convolver
needs to live in the scope of another function that does not call parent.removeFrame
. I’ll use this as an example for simplicity.)
Another useful fact is that, when doing this, only nodes that are disconnected from all their input will be deleted, while nodes that remain connected to their input will be kept alive even after the iframe
is removed, and only get deleted when the processing is finished:
let convolver = audioContext.createConvolver();
let gain = audioContext.createGain();
soundSource.connect(worklet).connect(convolver).connect(gain).connect(audioContext.destination);
audioContext.startRendering();
sleep(200);
convolver.disconnect();
gain = null;
gc();
parent.removeFrame(); //<-------- Get parent frame to delete outselves;
In this case, when worklet
finished processing, convolver
will remain alive while gain
will be gone. This will be very useful to control the lifetime of each individual node when writing the exploit.
Primitives of the vulnerability
Now let’s take a look at the possible locations where I may end up when the worklet
node finishes processing. First, I’ll introduce a few additional concepts to help understanding of how an audio graph is processed. Each AudioHandler
owns a list of inputs and outputs to the audio node.
class MODULES_EXPORT AudioHandler : public ThreadSafeRefCounted<AudioHandler> {
...
Vector<std::unique_ptr<AudioNodeInput>> inputs_;
Vector<std::unique_ptr<AudioNodeOutput>> outputs_;
The AudioNodeInput
(a subclass of AudioSummingJunction
) also holds a list of outputs that connects to it, which is not owned:
class AudioSummingJunction {
...
// m_renderingOutputs is a copy of m_outputs which will never be modified
// during the graph rendering on the audio thread. This is the list which
// is used by the rendering code.
// Whenever m_outputs is modified, the context is told so it can later
// update m_renderingOutputs from m_outputs at a safe time. Most of the
// time, m_renderingOutputs is identical to m_outputs.
// These raw pointers are safe. Owner of this AudioSummingJunction has
// strong references to owners of these AudioNodeOutput.
Vector<AudioNodeOutput*> rendering_outputs_;
};
Similarly, the AudioNodeOutput
keeps a list of AudioNodeInput
that are connected to it.
class MODULES_EXPORT AudioNodeOutput final {
...
// This HashSet holds connection references. We must call
// AudioNode::makeConnection when we add an AudioNodeInput to this, and must
// call AudioNode::breakConnection() when we remove an AudioNodeInput from
// this.
HashSet<AudioNodeInput*> inputs_;
So in the following example, the ConvolverHandler
owns one AudioNodeInput
and one AudioNodeOutput
, and the AudioNodeInput
holds a reference to the AudioNodeOutput
of worklet
, while the AudioNodeOutput
holds a reference to the AudioNodeInput
of gain
.
soundSource.connect(worklet).connect(convolver).connect(gain).connect(audioContext.destination);
When processing an audio graph, the code actually propagates backwards starting from the destination and calls AudioNodeInput::Pull
, which will then call AudioNodeOutput::Pull
for each of the outputs that connects to it. The AudioNodeOutput::Pull
then calls AudioHandler::ProcessIfNecessary
of the AudioHandler
that owns it, which will in turn call AudioNodeInput::Pull
for its input and propagates the call to the AudioHandler
that connects to it. This continues until the source node, which has no input, is reached, and then the actual processing will start with a call to AudioHandler::Process
. After AudioHandler::Process
completed, it will return to AudioHandler::ProcessIfNecessary
of the next AudioHandler
via AudioNodeOutput::Pull->AudioNodeInput::Pull->AudioHandler::PullInputs->AudioHandler::ProcessIfNecessary
, which will call AudioHandler::Process
of the next AudioHandler
. The following figure illustrates this with an example of two AudioHandler
, with the lower one being an AudioWorkletNode
:
In the figure, each large rectangle represents all the calls that are made with objects owned by an AudioHandler
, with the smaller rectangles inside representing functions that are being called. The blue arrows represent control flow edges that jump from one AudioHandler
to another. When triggering the use-after-free with an AudioWorkletHandler
that waits for a long time, the relevant jump is the one after AudioHandler::Process
is completed because at that point, the next AudioHandler
would have been deleted and replaced. In the above diagram, the red region indicates calls that are made with objects that would have been deleted when the calls are made. At this point, the code will first return to AudioNodeOutput::Pull
that is owned by the AudioWorkletHandler
, right after the call to ProcessIfNecessary
. The following is the code path that it will then follow, together with some possibilities for exploitation:
- When
Process
returns, it’ll first return toProcessIfNecessary
of theAudioWorkletHandler
, and thenAudioNodeOutput::Pull
of theAudioNodeOutput
that it owns. At this point, none of these objects are deleted (corresponds to the part of the blue arrow afterAudioHandler::Process
in the grey box in the bottom left of the figure). IfAudioNodeOutput::Pull
is called fromAudioNodeInput::Pull
, rather thanAudioNodeInput::SumAllConnections
, then it will jump back toAudioHandler::PullInputs
of a free’dAudioHandler
, which means thatinputs_
would have been deleted while the loop is still iterating. -
If the size of
inputs_
in the previous point is one to start with, then the loop would simply exit andProcessIfNecessary
would continue from right afterPullInputs
:void AudioHandler::ProcessIfNecessary(uint32_t frames_to_process) { ... PullInputs(frames_to_process); ... bool silent_inputs = InputsAreSilent(); if (silent_inputs && PropagatesSilence()) { SilenceOutputs(); ProcessOnlyAudioParams(frames_to_process); } else { UnsilenceOutputs(); Process(frames_to_process); }
At this point,
AudioHandler
is already free’d. Depending on the outcome ofInputsAreSilent
, the virtual functionPropagatesSilence
orProcess
will be called. -
If the deleted
AudioHandler
in the previous point was replaced by another validAudioHandler
so that the virtual function calls did not crash, thenProcessIfNecessary
will return to the callingAudioNodeOutput::Pull
. Now becauseAudioNodeOutput
andAudioHandler
are of different sizes, it is possible to replaceAudioHandler
while theAudioNodeOutput
that makes thisAudioNodeOutput::Pull
call is still free’d (the stack/registry still stores the pointer to the free’d object, instead of theAudioNodeOutput
of the replacedAudioHandler
). The functionAudioNodeOutput::Pull
will then callBus
and return a pointer to anAudioBus
object owned by thisAudioNodeOutput
. This means that the return value will also be free’d and the pointed to object (anAudioBus
) that can be replaced with controlled data. This, however, is only interesting in the path whereAudioNodeOutput::Pull
is called fromAudioNodeInput::SumAllConnections
as the path viaAudioNodeInput::Pull
does not make use of the return value.While point two can be used to hijack control flow by faking a vtable, this requires having an info leak to both defeat ASLR and to obtain a heap address for storing the fake vtable, so I’ll not be able to use it at this point. Point one can potentially be very powerful as it potentially allows me to replace
inputs_
with aVector
of pointers of any type, causing type confusion betweenAudioNodeInput
and many possible types. A simple CodeQL query can be used to find possible types:from Field f, PointerType t, Type c where f.getType().getName().matches("Vector<%") and f.getType().(ClassTemplateInstantiation).getTemplateArgument(0) = t and t.refersTo(c) select f, c, f.getDeclaringType(), f.getLocation()
However, as the
Pull
function is rather complex and involves many dereferencing, it is still not entirely clear how to proceed with this.
Getting an info leak (first attempt)
So let’s take a look at point three. When calling via SumAllConnections
, the return value of output
, which is now free’d, is passed to SumFrom
:
void AudioNodeInput::SumAllConnections(scoped_refptr<AudioBus> summing_bus,
uint32_t frames_to_process) {
...
for (unsigned i = 0; i < NumberOfRenderingConnections(); ++i) {
...
AudioBus* connection_bus = output->Pull(nullptr, frames_to_process);
// Sum, with unity-gain.
summing_bus->SumFrom(*connection_bus, interpretation);
}
}
Depending on the number of channels between summing_bus
and connection_bus
, various paths can be taken. The simplest path just calls AudioChannel::SumFrom
void AudioBus::SumFrom(const AudioBus& source_bus,
ChannelInterpretation channel_interpretation) {
...
if (number_of_source_channels == number_of_destination_channels) {
for (unsigned i = 0; i < number_of_source_channels; ++i)
Channel(i)->SumFrom(source_bus.Channel(i));
return;
}
and AudioChannel::SumFrom
simply copies the data in source_bus
, (connection_bus
) to summing_bus
, using the length of summing_bus
void AudioChannel::SumFrom(const AudioChannel* source_channel) {
...
if (IsSilent()) {
CopyFrom(source_channel);
} else {
//Copies using the length of `summing_bus` (`length()`)
vector_math::Vadd(Data(), 1, source_channel->Data(), 1, MutableData(), 1,
length());
}
}
So if I can replace the free’d AudioNodeOutput
with a Bus
with length shorter than that of summing_bus
, then I can get an out-of-bounds read. By arranging the heap, I can then use this to obtain an address to a vtable and/or a heap pointer, which will allow me to use the virtual function call primitive in point two to achieve remote code execution.
There are, however, a few problems. First, even if I can replace the free’d AudioNodeOutput
, I still need to have a valid pointer to connection_bus
that is a valid AudioBus
. A simple way is to just replace AudioNodeOutput
with another AudioNodeOutput
that has a short Bus
. Unfortunately, the Bus
of all AudioNodeOutput
are the same length (128), which makes sense, otherwise there will be out-of-bounds read/write all the time. Another possibility is that, since Bus
is owned by AudioNodeOutput
, I can just replace Bus
while leaving AudioNodeOutput
free’d. As the memory allocator used for allocating AudioNodeOutput
and Bus
, PartitionAlloc, is a bucket allocator and AudioNodeOutput
is of size 104 while AudioBus
is of size 32, by manipulating these two buckets separately, it is possible to replace Bus
while leaving AudioNodeOutput
free’d. While PartitionAlloc will garble up the first 8 bytes of a free’d object as an extra protection, this does not affect the pointer that AudioNodeOutput::Bus
returns and so connection_bus
will still be pointing to the object I use for replacement. If I replace Bus
with one that has a short length, then I can get an info leak.
The question now is how to create an AudioBus
with arbitrary length. Looking at various calls to AudioBus::Create
, the one in ConvolverHandler::SetBuffer
looks promising, as it can be reached easily from javascript by assigning the buffer
field of a ConvolverNode
. Unfortunately, the AudioBus
that is created is only local and will be deleted when the function call finished, making it rather difficult to use. In the end, the one in WebAudioBus::Initialize
works better as it can be reached via the decodeAudioData
function in javascript, with the length of the AudioBus
that is created controlled by the size of the input ArrayBuffer
(which contains some audio data). By using ffmpeg
to create an MP3 file of various lengths, I was able to use this function to create AudioBus
with various lengths.
The next problem is more difficult to solve. Note that while I can cause an out-of-bounds read and have the result copied into the backing store of the summing_bus
, there is no way I can read that data out because of a couple reasons:
- In order to trigger the use-after-free, I need to delete the
iframe
that contains the audio graph, which means all the audio nodes will be out of reach when the out-of-bounds read happens and hence there is no way to retrieve the data in thesumming_bus
of anAudioNodeInput
that belongs to that graph. - If
summing_bus
is also free’d, then it may be possible to replace it with anotherAudioBus
in anAudioNodeInput
that I can still reach and then perhaps there will be a way to read off the data from thesumming_bus
in thatAudioNodeInput
. This, unfortunately, is not the case either, becausesumming_bus
is not a raw pointer, but ascoped_refptr
that shares its ownership.
void AudioNodeInput::SumAllConnections(scoped_refptr<AudioBus> summing_bus,
uint32_t frames_to_process) {
...
for (unsigned i = 0; i < NumberOfRenderingConnections(); ++i) {
...
summing_bus->SumFrom(*connection_bus, interpretation);
}
}
This means that, even though everything is free’d by now, summing_bus
will be kept alive until at least the SumAllConnections
call is finished, so there is no way to replace summing_bus
with something that I can still reach from another frame.
The runaway graph
It’s time to take another look at the iterator invalidation primitive in point one of the previous section. As mentioned before, by putting an AudioNode
that takes multiple inputs, such as the ChannelMergerNode
after a AudioWorkletNode
and then delete the iframe
that contains the audio graph to trigger the use-after-free bug, the ChannelMergerNode
and hence inputs_
will be
deleted while the loop in AudioHandler::PullInputs
is still iterating
void AudioHandler::PullInputs(uint32_t frames_to_process) {
...
for (auto& input : inputs_)
input->Pull(nullptr, frames_to_process);
}
In practice, this means that after finishing the input->Pull
call, the input
iterator will be incremented and point to the next location in the free’d backing store of the now deleted inputs_
. This will continue until it reaches the length of the original inputs_
. So by allocating another Vector
of the same size as inputs_
I replace the free’d backing store with the backing store of the new Vector
. While this can be used to cause type confusion and call AudioNodeInput::Pull
on many different types of objects, it’s not obvious what object I should use to replace the AudioNodeInput
.
Instead, I’m just going to stick to the principle of small iteration in software development and replace it with something so trivial that it hardly does anything. I’m going to just replace the ChannelMergerNode
with another ChannelMergerNode
that lives on an audio graph in the parent frame. So when the bug triggers, it will just carry on running another audio graph that lives in the parent frame.
The following figure shows what happens with this object replacement:
The dash borders and edges indicate nodes and edges that would have been run if the child iframe
is not deleted, whereas the green nodes indicate the nodes that are actually run. After processing the top branch in the child iframe
, the frame gets deleted and the ChannelMergerNode
is replaced with the one in the parent frame. This leads to the bottom branch of the audio graph in the parent frame being run instead.
So what can I gain from this? I’m just running an audio graph from the parent frame, which I can do directly from the parent frame by calling the startRendering
function.
The answer is what happens when I delete an AudioNode
. As explained earlier on, when an AudioNode
gets garbage collected, to prevent the underlying AudioHandler
from being deleted while it is still in use for processing the audio graph, the AudioNode
will check whether the audio graph it belongs to is being processed by calling the IsPullingAudioGraph
method of the AudioContext
:
void AudioNode::Dispose() {
...
if (context()->IsPullingAudioGraph()) {
context()->GetDeferredTaskHandler().AddRenderingOrphanHandler(
std::move(handler_));
}
This simply checks whether the audio graph is in a kRunning
state
bool OfflineAudioContext::IsPullingAudioGraph() const {
...
return ContextState() == BaseAudioContext::kRunning;
}
and transfers the ownership of the AudioHandler
if it is. In this case, however, because the audio graph in the parent frame is being processed as part of the graph in the child frame, the audio graph would not have been in a kRunning
state because it has not been started from the parent frame. (In the actual exploit, I had to start and then suspend the graph to get the nodes to connect to each other, but that makes no difference as the graph would then be in a kSuspended
state, so the IsPullingAudioGraph
check will still pass) This means that the ownership transfer of the AudioHandler
would not happen and it will just be deleted while the graph is being processed.
In particular, this means that I can cause the same type of use-after-free in this graph without having to delete the frame that contains it. This is important, because the main problem when trying to get an info leak before was that all the nodes where removed with the iframe
that contains them and so there was no way to retrieve the leaked data. But now I can cause the use-after-free without deleting the frame that contains the nodes, I will be able to access them after the use-after-free is triggered and be able to read the leaked data.
Getting an info leak (for real)
The following steps can now be used to get an info leak.
- Trigger the use-after-free bug in a child
iframe
and use the loop iterator invalidation primitive to cause a branch of an audio graph to run in the parent frame:The above figure shows the actual graph that I’ll use for replacement. It consists of two
ScriptProcessorNode
sandwiching aGainNode
. TheScriptProcessorNode
is like theAudioWorkletNode
, which allows user supplied scripts to be run for processing audio data. However, in the case ofScriptProcessorNode
, the script is run in the context of the dom window, which allows me to access theAudioContext
and various nodes. This makes it easier to useScriptProcessorNode
for the exploit and I’ll use this instead ofAudioWorkletNode
in the parent frame graph. -
In the audio processing script of the
ScriptProcessorNode
script2
, remove theGainNode
that follows it and garbage collect it, so that itsAudioInputNode
andAudioOutputNode
, are free’d.To construct the info leak, I’ll also need to replace the deleted
GainNode
to prevent the virtual function calls from crashing, while leaving itsAudioOutputNode
free’d. I can do this by manipulating the heap to create extra free’dAudioOutputNode
so that when theGainNode
is free’d, itsAudioOutputNode
won’t be at the head of the free list and won’t be replaced. I do this by creating an extraChannelMergerNode
:function createSource() { let s = audioCtx.createChannelMerger(3); } //The audio processor of the first ScriptProcessorNode function scriptProcess2(audioProcessingEvent) { //Need to use for creating holes for AudioOutputNode, so they don't get reclaim createSource(); ... script2.disconnect(); //<--- remove reference to the `GainNode` gc(); //<--- first deletes `GainNode`, then `ChannelMergerNode` created in `createSource`. //Needs to wait for the small objects allocated by GC to clear sleep(4000); let gain = audioCtx2.createGain(); //<---- replace gain to get virtual function calls through let src0 = audioCtx2.createChannelMerger(1); //<--- To arrange heap for AudioBus ... }
While the call to createSource
may look redundant, remember that the ChannelMergerNode
s
created in createSource
does not get removed until garbage collection, and at that point, it will actually be removed after the GainNode
, leaving extra AudioOutputNode
in the head of the freelist.
Then when the deleted GainNode
is replaced with another GainNode
, the free’d AudioNodeOutput
of the old GainNode
will not be occupied. This free’d GainNode
will then be responsible for calling Bus
and provide us with a free’d AudioBus
.
In the figure, green arrows indicate objects that are free’d when another object is deleted and red arrows indicate objects that are created.
To replace the AudioBus
owned by the AudioNodeOutput
, which is of size 32, the bucket of size 32 also needs to be manipulated. I again use another ChannelMergerNode
for this purpose.
At the same time, care must also be taken to not replace the AudioNodeOutput
of the deleted GainNode
…
While there are many requirements to meet and AudioBus
is allocated from a rather noisy bucket, unlike in other situations where the heap is often shared by other processes that are not in our control, the renderer is very much an isolated process that owns its heap exclusively. As such, renderer heap spray can be done in a very precise and specific manner as long as the script is run from a fresh renderer (which would be the case when clicking a link from a logged-in context, such as via email or Twitter), so this does not cause too much of a reliability issue for the exploit.
Once the heap is put into the correct state so that the AudioBus
owned by the now deleted GainNode
is at the correct position of the freelist, the AudioContext::decodeAudioData
function can be used to create an AudioBus
of appropriate length to trigger the out-of-bounds read. This function takes an ArrayBuffer
of an audio file (e.g. mp3
, ogg
) and decodes it in a background thread. It’ll create an AudioBus
that has the appropriate length to hold the decoded results:
void AsyncAudioDecoder::DecodeOnBackgroundThread(
DOMArrayBuffer* audio_data,
float sample_rate,
V8DecodeSuccessCallback* success_callback,
V8DecodeErrorCallback* error_callback,
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver,
BaseAudioContext* context,
scoped_refptr<base::SingleThreadTaskRunner> task_runner) {
...
scoped_refptr<AudioBus> bus = CreateBusFromInMemoryAudioFile(
audio_data->Data(), audio_data->ByteLength(), false, sample_rate); //<----- AudioBus created here
...
if (context) {
PostCrossThreadTask(
*task_runner, FROM_HERE,
CrossThreadBindOnce(&AsyncAudioDecoder::NotifyComplete,
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(audio_data),
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(success_callback),
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(error_callback),
WTF::RetainedRef(std::move(bus)), //<------ passed to `NotifyComplete`
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(resolver),
WrapCrossThreadPersistent(context)));
}
}
The created AudioBus
is then passed to NotifyComplete
as a task on the main thread, and to be deleted when NotifyComplete
is finished:
void AsyncAudioDecoder::NotifyComplete(
DOMArrayBuffer*,
V8DecodeSuccessCallback* success_callback,
V8DecodeErrorCallback* error_callback,
AudioBus* audio_bus,
ScriptPromiseResolver* resolver,
BaseAudioContext* context) {
...
AudioBuffer* audio_buffer = AudioBuffer::CreateFromAudioBus(audio_bus);
// If the context is available, let the context finish the notification.
if (context) {
context->HandleDecodeAudioData(audio_buffer, resolver, success_callback,
error_callback);
}
}
As AudioBus
is only a temporary object here, and will be deleted when the decoding is finished, I need to make sure that it lives long enough for the out-of-bounds read to happen. In order to do this, I can use the setInterval
javascript function to jam the task queue. When setInterval
is called, it creates a delayed task. This task, as well as the NotifyComplete
task posted by DecodeOnBackgroundThread
, are posted to the same task queue for execution on the main thread. By creating tasks with setInterval
, I can cause delays in NotifyComplete
being run because any task posted before NotifyComplete
will have to be run before NotifyComplete
, and they both have to run on the main thread. This will allow me to keep the AudioBus
alive for a long enough time so that when AudioNodeInput::SumAllConnections
which causes the out-of-bounds read is using this AudioBus
in the audio thread, it will still be alive.
By using ffmpeg
to create a silent mp3
file, I was able to create an AudioBus
with a minimal length of 47. As the length of an AudioBus
from an AudioNodeInput
is 128 and the backing store of AudioBus
is of float format with a padding of size 16 (16 for Android and 32 for x86), this means I can use the out-of-bounds read primitive to read an object of size between 204 and 528. A CodeQL query similar to what I used before can be used to identify such objects and select the appropriate length of the file to use:
class FastMallocClass extends Class {
FastMallocClass() {
exists(Operator op, Function fastMalloc | op.hasName("operator new") and
fastMalloc.hasName("FastMalloc") and op.calls(fastMalloc) and
op.getDeclaringType() = this.getABaseClass*()
)
}
}
from FastMallocClass c
where c.getSize() <= 528 and c.getSize() > 204
select c, c.getLocation(), c.getSize()
Here I made the improvement to only include objects allocated in the FastMalloc
partition, which is where the backing store (AudioArray
) of AudioBus
is allocated. Upon looking at the results, the BiquadDSPKernel
is particularly useful. Apart from being about to leak the vtable, it contains a field biquad_
that stores five AudioDoubleArray
. This means that by leaking an object of type BiquadDSPKernel
, I’ll be able to also leak the addresses of the backing stores of these AudioDoubleArray
, which can then be used for storing a fake vtable to hijack virtual function calls.
So by arranging the heap to place BiquadDSPKernel
behind my AudioBus
and then triggering the bug to cause an out-of-bounds read, I’m able to leak BiquadDSPKernel
objects into the AudioBus
of the AudioNodeInput
of the next AudioNode
. To read the input data, I can use a ScriptProcessorNode
, which allows me to read the input using a javascript function. I can then obtain the leaked vtable
and the addresses to various AudioDoubleArray
.
Getting an RCE
At this point, the rest of the exploit is fairly standard. Once I obtain the address of the vtable to the BiquadDSPKernel
, I can use it to find the offset of libchrome.so
. With the offset of libchrome.so
, I can locate the addresses of ROP gadgets inside it and create a fake vtable in one of the AudioDoubleArray
that belongs to the BiquadDSPKernel
so that virtual function pointers within this fake vtable points to a gadget of my choice.
After that, the use-after-free bug can then be triggered once more. This time it goes directly to the path in point two of Section Primitives of the vulnerability to call a virtual function. The free’d AudioHandler
object can now be replaced by an AudioArray
of appropriate size that is filled with controlled data so that its vtable points to the fake vtable that I created above.
Again, I use gadgets similar to the ones I used in my last post to call OS::SetPermissions
to overwrite page permissions of the AudioDoubleArray
in the BiquadDSPKernel
to rwx
. Once that is done, I can place shell code in these AudioDoubleArray
and trigger the bug once more to run arbitrary code. In the actual exploit, a DelayNode
is used as the free’d AudioHandler
and the feedforward
coefficients of the IIRFilterNode
is used to fake the DelayHandler
.
The full exploit can be found here with some set up notes.
Conclusions
In this post, we’ve once again seen that the complicated object cleanup, together with the subtlety of multi-threading, have led to vulnerabilities in WebAudio that are exploitable as renderer RCE. While vulnerabilities in blink in general take more time to exploit compared to a bug in v8, it remains a large and viable attack surface to gain (sandboxed) RCE in Chrome.
For the series as a whole, we also saw how the sandboxing architecture, together with the quick fixing of vulnerabilities in Chrome, really helped make it hard to obtain a full chain (and making sure that full chains don’t last long even if they made it into the wild). The renderer vulnerability used in this series took about six weeks to fix from when it was first reported, while the sandbox escape took a similar amount of time to fix, which is fairly standard for Chrome. This greatly reduces the chance of renderer vulnerabilities overlapping with sandbox escapes. As we saw in the case of this series, the renderer vulnerability did not overlap with the sandbox escape in a stable version of Chrome because of this quick fixing of bugs. It is efficiency of bug fixing that makes sandboxing much more effective. On the other hand, we also saw from the sandbox escape post how once-per-boot-ASLR (i.e. processes forking from Zygote) greatly reduces the effectiveness of application sandboxing in Android. While the base address of Chrome is still randomized between the renderer and the browser, many other libraries are not and I was still able to use gadgets within those libraries to escape the Chrome sandbox without much effort. While once-per-boot-ASLR is still very useful to mitigate remote attacks, as we have seen from this post, where most of the effort in writing the exploit was spent on defeating ASLR, it had little use against local privilege escalations. As both major platforms, (Windows and Android) implement once-per-boot-ASLR, this remains one of the greatest weaknesses of the Chrome sandbox.
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