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Prefect is now a GitHub secret scanning partner

GitHub secret scanning protects users by searching repositories for known types of secrets. By identifying and flagging these secrets, our scans help prevent data leaks and fraud.

We have partnered with Prefect to scan for their access tokens and help secure our mutual users on public and private repositories. The Prefect service account API keys are not associated with a user and are restricted to a specific tenant, but they are recommended for application and automation use. GitHub will forward access tokens found in public repositories to Prefect, who will immediately email the owner of the leaked key. More information about Prefect API Tokens can be found here.

GitHub Advanced Security customers can also scan for Prefect tokens and block them from entering their private and public repositories with push protection.

You can now create a custom role to bypass branch protections without having to grant the Admin role. Previously, to bypass branch protections you had to be an Admin which provides additional permissions that may not be needed. For tighter control of Admin permissions, you can now craft a custom role that has the Bypass branch protections permission, allowing just the right amount of access.

Image of Custom roles Inherited from Maintain role that adds the new Bypass branch protections permission

To enforce branch protections for all Admins and roles with the "Bypass branch protections" permission, enable Do not allow bypassing the above settings in your branch protection rules.

Image of checkbox selecting Do not allow bypassing the above settings

This permission differs from the Push commits to protected branches permission, which allows pushing to a protected branch, but branch protection rules will still apply and could result in a push being denied.

For more information, visit Managing custom repository roles for an organization in the GitHub documentation.

We appreciate feedback on this and other topics in GitHub's public feedback discussions.

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Users with 2FA enabled may see false-alert flags in their security log for recovery_code_regenerated events between July 15 and August 11, 2022.
These events were improperly emitted during an upgrade to the 2FA platform. The storage format of the per-user value GitHub uses to generate your recovery codes was updated, causing the watch job to trigger the erroneous recovery_code_regenerated event.

No action is required from impacted users with regards to these events. GitHub has a policy to not delete security log events, even ones generated in error. For this reason, we are adding flags to signal that these events are false-alerts. No recovery codes were regenerated, and your existing saved recovery codes are still valid.

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